Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Sphaerus, Tertullian and JC Beall / G Restall

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34 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
13252 Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
13247 A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
10688 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
13249 (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 5. Relevant Logic
13243 Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall]
13245 Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall]
13246 Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall]
13254 A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall]
13255 Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall]
13242 It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
13250 Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
13235 Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall]
13238 Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
13234 The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
13232 Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall]
10690 Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
13241 The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
10691 Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall]
13253 There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
13240 A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall]
10695 Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
10689 A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
10696 A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall]
13236 Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10693 Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / d. The Preface paradox
13237 Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
10692 Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
13244 Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
20769 Sphaerus he was not assenting to the presence of pomegranates, but that it was 'reasonable' [Sphaerus, by Diog. Laertius]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
13239 Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
13248 We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
13233 Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
16713 Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
6610 I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]